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Abstract
We investigate the marketing practice of framing a price as a discount from an
earlier price. We discuss two reasons why a discounted price rather than a merely
low price can make a rational consumer more willing to purchase. First, a high
initial price can indicate the seller has chosen to supply a high-quality product.
Second, a seller with limited stock runs a clearance sale, later consumers infer that
an unsold product may be poor quality, but if the initial price was higher they do
not downgrade their evaluation of quality as much. In either case, if able to do so a
seller has an incentive to engage in ctitious pricing, where the reported initial price
is exaggerated.
Keywords: Reference dependence, sales tactics, false advertising, ctitious pricing,
consumer protection.
1 Introduction
A great many consumer prices are expressed as a discount from some price o¤ered earlier.
Despite its prevalence, though, this practice of discount pricing has apparently received
little economic analysis.1 In most models of sales, for instance, consumers care only about
the price level, and whether or not a price is labelled as being discounted from some higher
price plays no role. Why should a consumer be more likely to buy a jacket priced at $100
The authors are respectively in the economics departments of the University of Oxford and the Uni-
versity of Colorado at Boulder. We are very grateful to Kyle Bagwell, Kr Eliaz, Glenn Ellison, David Gill,
Salar Jahedi, Andrew Rhodes, Mike Riordan, Rani Spiegler, John Vickers and Jidong Zhou for helpful
discussions.
1Table 4.1 in the report by the UKs Competition & Market Authority (2015) indicates that in 2014 at
least 8% of (non-alcoholic) products in major supermarkets were included in a reference price promotion
at any one time. Section 4 of that report provides more evidence from this sector about the frequency and
forms of discount pricing.
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accompanied by a sign which reads 50% of the previous pricethan he would be if the
price were merely stated as $100?
In this paper, the phenomenon of discount pricing is explored using the framework
we describe in more detail in section 2. A monopolist sells its product over two periods,
and consumers are segmented over time and must buy in their own period. Consumers in
the second period cannot directly observe the initial price, although the rm can report to
them its previous price (for instance, with a sign reading 50% of the previous price). The
rms environment can di¤er in two dimensions. First, the legal regime might or might
not permit the rm to make false claims about its initial price. Second, consumers might
be sophisticated, and ignore unsubstantiated claims about previous prices that is, they
discount the discount or they might be naive and take the rms claims at face value.
Consumer policy interventions might also be organized along these two dimensions. Legal
policy might, if well enforced, act to prevent false discounts. Alternatively, an education
campaign might be launched to inform consumers that rms can and do present misleading
claims about their earlier prices.
We describe three ways in which consumers in the second period care about the initial
price. First, as discussed in section 2, behavioural consumers might simply care intrinsically
about the price that earlier consumers paid, and all else equal a consumers propensity to
buy is greater when the product has been o¤ered to others at a higher price. That is, these
consumers like the feeling of getting a bargain, and this makes them more inclined to
purchase.
In section 3 we go on to discuss two reasons why rational consumers will care about
an earlier price. These each involve a mechanism whereby less informed consumers in
the second period use the initial price as signal of an unobserved characteristic of the
product, where a higher initial price indicates the product is more desirable. In section
3.1, uninformed consumers take the rms initial price as a signal of its choice of quality.
The rm sells its product to two groups of consumers: keen buyers who can accurately
determine the products quality and wish to buy early, and casual buyers who arrive later
and cannot directly observe quality. Since the former group will only buy the product at
a high price if the quality is high, later buyers use the initial price o¤ered as an indicator
of quality. In this framework, the rm has an incentive to supply a higher quality product
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when it must honestly report its initial price. Thus, the rms ability to write was $200,
now $100, if credible, induces it to supply a better product.
In section 3.2, we study a clearance sale where a seller with limited stock o¤ers its
product at a discount in the second period if it has stock left unsold after the rst period.
The fact that the product did not sell well initially indicates that early consumers did not
think the price/quality combination was good value, a form of adverse selection. While the
presence of unsold stock is bad newsabout the desirability of the product to later, less
informed, consumers, that news is less bad there is less adverse selection if the initial
price was high, and for this reason later consumers care about the initial price as well as
the current price. All else equal, later consumers are more inclined to purchase unsold
stock when they think the rms initial price was high.
If for any of these reasons later consumers care about the initial price, a seller has
an incentive to exaggerate its report of its initial price, an important instance of what
is often termed ctitious or deceptive pricing.2 The media regularly features stories in
which a rms claimed discounts are alleged to be ctitious. For instance, a supermarkets
heavily advertised 15% average price reduction may have been preceded by an unadvertised
gradual price rise cancelling out the reduction, or a retailer may market its stock at prices
which are permanently 70% o¤.3 If consumers are sophisticated and know that rms are
able to misrepresent their earlier price without penalty, they will simply regard claimed
price reductions as pu¤ery and pay them no attention. The result is that a potentially
useful channel of communication is shut down. In the models presented below, the rm
would welcome a policy which forces it to report initial prices honestly as this enables it to
credibly communicate its initial price to later consumers. However, if instead consumers
are naive and believe a rms false claims, these consumers may be induced to pay more
for the product than they would otherwise. In our models below, the rm in this case is
harmed if it is required to report its initial price honestly. Changing the regulatory regime
to prevent ctitious pricing has less clear-cut e¤ects on overall welfare. In the model in
section 3.1, the policy change will induce the rm to increase its initial price and its product
2Other forms of ctitious or deceptive pricing include claims that a price is below other prices currently
available, either in other outlets of the same seller or from other sellers, or that the free gift which
accompanies a purchase has an exaggerated value.
3See Harkrader (1962) for a long list of such dodges.
3
quality, and this is good for welfare. In section 3.2, though, the rm cannot a¤ect quality
and the policy will merely increase the initial price which will harm welfare.
There are a number of earlier contributions which discuss issues related to our models.
Reference dependence came to prominence with the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Thaler (1985), and is now the subject of a vast literature in economics.4 Consumers
can be loss-averse that is, they care more about avoiding losses than they do about
obtaining the same sized gains or they might be bargain-loving and experience pleasure
from extracting a bargain from a seller.5 In our simple model in section 2, all that matters
is that a consumers propensity to buy increases if the reference price in our context, the
initial price increases. One implication of Thalers theory is that rms might prot from a
high suggested retail price, which serves as a reference price, and a price discounted from
this suggested price may provide consumers with a transaction utility. Evidence that
consumers incorporate previous prices into their reference price is discussed by Kalyanaram
and Winer (1995). They suggest that the plausibility of this method of reference price
formation is called into question by the observation in surveys that many consumers cannot
recall previous prices of a particular good; however, this problem is overcome if the current
price is explicitly framed as a discount from a previous price, so that the rm itself recalls
the earlier price.
Section 3.1 presents a model where the rms initial price reects the rms chosen qual-
ity to later, less expert, consumers. The initial price is informative since early consumers
are well informed, and would not purchase unless the chosen quality was high enough to
merit the high price. A very di¤erent mechanism operates in Bagwell and Riordan (1991),
4See Spiegler (2011, Part Three) for an overview of recent contributions. An early discussion is found in
Scitovsky (1944, page 101): price competition usually takes the form of the seller trying to introduce into
the buyers consciousness two distinct prices [...] One of them is the price to be paid for the commodity, the
other is the price which is to indicate its worth. The sale of Fifty Shilling Clothesat thirty-ve shillings
before the war, or of dollar watches at eighty-nine cents in America, are examples of this practice.
Further examples are the granting of special discounts; and special sales at reduced prices, where both the
old and the new reduced price are marked on the price tag and the consumer judges the cheapness of the
bargain by the di¤erence between the two prices..
5In Zolas The LadiesParadise, the owner of the eponymous department store had discovered that
she [the consumer] could not resist a bargain, that she bought things without needing them if she thought
she was getting them cheaply; and on this observation he based his system of price reductions. (Émile
Zola, The LadiesParadise, trans. Brian Nelson, Oxford University Press, 2008, page 235.) Harkrader
(1962, page 1) quotes a corporate submission to the FTC: Everyone loves, and hopes to nd, bargains.
It is this universal human trait that is exploited by the practice of ctitious pricing, whatever its form.
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who study a model where a rm has private information about the exogenous quality of
its product and attempts to signal its quality with its price. In contrast to our model,
they assume later buyers are more likely to be informed about quality (for instance, by
reading consumer reports which appear after the products launch). They nd that high
and declining prices signal high product quality: the rm distorts its price above the full-
information level in order to signal high quality, and, as more consumers become informed,
there is less price distortion in later periods. While their insights are derived mainly in
a setting where the rms current price signals quality, they consider an extension where
later consumers can observe the rms past price. In this case, the rms prices may be
more distorted in period 1 but less distorted in period 2, compared to when past price
is not observed, and they nd that the high-quality rm has an incentive to reveal past
price information to uninformed consumers. Thus, when a rm makes sequential sales of
a product, the exogenous quality of which is the rms private information, a policy that
bans false discounts could boost prot.
Our model in section 3.2, where a rms initial price a¤ects the pool of qualities avail-
able in the second period, modies Lazears (1986) model of clearance sales so that later
consumers cannot observe the products quality. Lazears basic model supposes that a rm
has a single item to sell over two periods, and there is a single consumer present in each
period. The two consumers have the same valuation for the product, but the rm does not
know this common valuation. If the item remains unsold after the rst period, the rm
infers that this valuation is below its initial price, and so o¤ers a discount to the second
consumer. In Lazears model, the second consumer has no interest in the rms initial price,
and she will buy whenever the sale price is below her valuation. In our model, by contrast,
the second consumer does not observe quality directly and like the rm itself infers
expected quality from the observation that the product did not sell initially.
Taylor (1999) also modies Lazears model so that later consumers care about the initial
price. He studies how best to sell a house when distinct pools of buyers arrive over two
periods. The seller knows the quality of the house (about which buyers obtain a noisy
signal), while buyers have idiosyncratic tastes for the house given its quality. If the house
remains unsold after the rst period, the seller adjusts his reservation price for the second
period. The house does not sell in the rst period if (a) no buyer was present, (b) all buyers
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had negative signals about the houses quality, or (c) all buyers had valuations below the
asking price. Similar to our mechanism in section 3.2, when the seller sets a high initial
price which is observed by later buyers, this makes (c) a relatively more likely explanation,
and a later buyers belief about quality is less adversely a¤ected. Also related is Bose et
al. (2006), who study a market where a monopolist supplies a product with uncertain
quality, and consumers arrive sequentially and decide whether to purchase the item on the
basis of their own private signal of quality and the history of previous purchase and price
decisions. They investigate the monopolists choice of prices over time. The rm is keen to
avoid consumer pessimism about quality, and one way to do this is to charge high prices
initially so that later consumers infer that an earlier decision not to purchase is less likely
to be due to observing a negative private signal of quality.6
While our paper discusses deceptive claims about earlier prices (which can operate
indirectly to inate a consumers estimate of product quality), a rm might also make
exaggerated claims about its products quality directly. A recent paper on this topic,
which also summarises earlier papers on a similar theme, is Rhodes and Wilson (2016).
They study a single-period model where a monopolist has private information about its
exogenous quality, where higher quality (if known by consumers) acts to shift the inverse
demand curve upwards. The rm can make claims about its quality, and a regulator can
costlessly evaluate such claims (after consumers have made their purchases) and levy a
specied ne if the rm makes a false claim. If the regulator levies no ne, all types of rm
will claim to o¤er high quality and communication is shut down, while if the ne is large
enough the rm will make truthful claims. However, they show there are cases depending
on the shape of the demand curve where it is socially optimal to levy an intermediate ne
which induces low quality rms to sometimes make false claims: false claims can counteract
market power by making consumers more pessimistic about quality and inducing the rm
to reduce its price.
6See also Miklós-Thal and Zhang (2013), who study a model where a monopolist with uncertain and
exogenous product quality sells over two periods to segmented consumers who can buy only in their period.
All consumers have a private signal of quality, and later consumers also observe the sellers sales, price
and marketing e¤ort in the rst period. Here, marketing e¤ort inuences the number of consumers who
know about the product in the rst period. The authors show that the rm might deliberately choose a
low marketing e¤ort in order to make later consumers infer that high initial sales are more due to high
quality than the presence of a large pool of potential consumers.
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2 A Framework for Analysis
Consider a situation where a monopolist sells its product over two periods, with price p1
in the rst period and price p2 in the second. Consumers in the two periods comprise
distinct groups and can buy only in their own period, and second-period consumers do not
directly observe the rms initial price. Nevertheless, in the second period the rm can
report its initial price, for instance by framing its current price as 50% o¤ the initial
price. We assume the second-period consumers care about the rms choice of initial price.
As explored in sections 3.1 and 3.2, this might be because they are uninformed about an
aspect of the product, and the initial price reects this unobserved attribute. Alternatively,
consumers might simply have reference-dependent preferences and intrinsically care about
the deal they obtain relative to consumers in the earlier period. In the situations we study,
period-1 consumers do not care about the subsequent price. Because of this, it is not
relevant for our analysis whether or not the rm can commit to its period-2 price in the
rst period.
The rms regulatory environment may take one of two forms: a laissez-faire regime,
where the rm is free to make any claims about its initial price to period-2 consumers,
and an honest regime, where any report it makes of its initial price is required to be
truthful. In the specic models which follow, in the honest regime the rm will always
report its initial price to period-2 consumers rather than remain silent. In a laissez-faire
regime, second-period consumers might be sophisticated, so that they accurately forecast
the rms equilibrium choice of initial price and ignore any claims it makes about its initial
price. Sophisticated consumers recognize that the rm may have an incentive to exaggerate
its reported previous price. Alternatively, second-period consumers might be naive and
believe the rms claim about its initial price. Specically, we assume that naive consumers
mistakenly believe that regulation is in place to ensure honest reporting from the rm.7 As
such, we assume that a naive consumer makes the same inferences from the rms (possibly
misleading) report as does a consumer in the honest regime. In particular, in the honest
7As Nelson (1974, page 749) puts it, Consumers are unlikely to be legal experts. Some, therefore, are
likely to believe that certain forms of deceptive advertising are prevented by law when, in fact, they are
not.In their experimental study of how consumers react to advertised reference prices (ARPs), Urbany
et al. (1988, page 108) observe that one reason consumers may judge ARPs believable, even exaggerated
ones, is that they believe it is illegal to exaggerate references prices and that the law is strictly enforced.
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regime there is no distinction between the two kinds of consumer.
In sum we study three market environments: (i) an honest regulatory regime; (ii)
a laissez-faire regulatory regime where consumers are sophisticated, and (iii) a laissez-
faire regulatory regime where consumers are naive. Since the rms pricing policy is least
constrained in environment (iii), and most constrained in environment (ii), the following
result is immediate:
Proposition 1 Among the three market environments, the monopolist obtains the most
prot when there is a laissez-faire regulatory regime and consumers are naive, and obtains
the least prot when there is a laissez-faire regulatory regime and consumers are sophisti-
cated.
Therefore, when consumers are sophisticated, the seller would welcome a policy which
requires it to report its initial price accurately. Such a policy opens up a channel of
communication from the rm to its consumers, which will boost its prot. Conversely, in
this framework if the seller protests against a proposed introduction of an honest regime
it considers consumers to be naive.
This discussion implicitly assumes that in the second period the seller must report
its initial price to consumers. In practice, of course, sellers need not report their earlier
prices. When the seller makes no report, we assume that period-2 consumers, regardless
of sophistication, accurately forecast the rms equilibrium choice of initial price. Thus,
when the seller does not report its initial price the outcome is as in environment (ii) above.
Since, as in Proposition 1, this yields the lowest prot to the seller, we can deduce that
the seller will choose to report its initial price to period-2 consumers.
In more detail, we study situations in which the rms total prot takes the form
 = 1(p1) + 2(p1; p
e
1) ; (1)
where 1 is its prot in the rst period when its initial price is p1, and 2 is its (maximum)
prot in the second period when it chooses the initial price p1 but second-period consumers
believe it has chosen the initial price pe1. (Section 3 presents some microfoundations for this
reduced-form prot expression.) Here, 1 is single-peaked in p1, while 2 weakly increases
with both p1 and pe1 (at least over the relevant range of initial prices). For instance,
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if second-period consumers believe high quality is associated with a high initial price, a
higher pe1 will boost their demand and the prot 2 which can be extracted from them. If
the seller has limited stock then when its true initial price is higher, this will leave more
stock available to be sold in the second period, and so 2 increases with p1 as well.
In environment (i), where pe1  p1, the rm chooses its initial price to maximize 1(p1)+
2(p1; p1). In environment (ii), an equilibrium initial price, say p1, is such that
setting p1 = p1 maximizes 1(p1) + 2(p1; p

1) :
That is to say, the sophisticated consumer anticipates the initial price p1, and given this
the rm chooses its initial price to maximize 1(p1)+2(p1; p1) and in equilibrium we have
p1 = p

1. Finally, in environment (iii) the rm can choose p
e
1, and so will choose to report
the highest (reasonable) price it might charge in period 1 and then choose its true initial
price to maximize (1).
Reference dependence: The most direct illustration of this framework involves a straight-
forward kind of reference dependence, where the demand from second-period consumers
increases with pe1, the price these consumers believe that initial consumers paid. (Here, we
suppose there are no capacity constraints, and the rms sales in the rst period do not
inuence its supply in the second period.) In this case, 2 in (1) is an increasing function
of pe1 and does not depend separately on the true initial price p1. In the honest regime,
the initial price maximizes 1(p1) + 2(p1), so that p1 is above the myopicprice which
maximizes rst-period prot 1(). In a laissez-faire regime, however, the rm chooses the
myopic price which maximizes 1(), and so a move to an honest regime will increase the
rms initial price (which therefore harms the period-1 consumers). Intuitively, in order
to deliver a bargainto period-2 consumers, the rm needs to exploit the period-1 con-
sumers somewhat. (Sophisticated secondperiod consumers anticipate this myopic price,
while naive consumers are told, and believe, that the initial price was high.)
To illustrate, suppose that the seller has costless production, that its rst-period de-
mand is Q1(p1) = 1   p1, and its second-period demand when these consumers pay the
price p2 and believe the initial price was pe1 is Q2(p
e
1; p2) = 1 + p
e
1  2p2. (This specication
is chosen so that when second-period consumers anticipate that the initial consumers paid
the same as them, so that pe1 = p2, their demand takes the same form as that in the rst
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period.) In the honest regime we have p1 = 57 and p2 =
3
7
, so that the product is o¤ered at
a 40% discount in the second period. In the laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated con-
sumer we have p1 = 12 and p2 =
3
8
. Thus both prices rise if the regulatory regime changes
so that the rm must report its initial price accurately. Clearly, the rst-period consumers
are made worse o¤ with a move to an honest regime. However, if the second-period con-
sumer surplus is evaluated as the area under the demand curve, so that second-period
consumer surplus with prices (p1; p2) is 14(1+p1 2p2)2, then this surplus actually increases
in the honest regime, despite the period-2 price being higher.8
This simple model is reminiscent of Coases (1972) model of dynamic pricing, but in
reverse time. In a two-period version of Coases model, forward-looking consumers decide
when to purchase from the rm. If the rm cannot commit to its second-period price at the
start, consumers anticipate the price will fall over time and some of them will wait to buy
later. If the rm could commit to its future price for instance, if public policy somehow
forced the rm to revealis second-period price at the start the result is typically that
both prices will rise relative to the no-commitment regime. In the current context, starting
from a laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated consumer, when policy forces the rm to
reveal its initial price this too will typically cause both prices to increase. Policy which
prevents ctitious pricing therefore acts as a commitment device to the seller, and enables
it to boost its prot.
In the next section we discuss two alternative models which t into the general frame-
work (1), and which assume a more standardform of consumer preferences.
3 Two Microfoundations
3.1 Initial price as signal of rms choice of quality
In this section we modify a simple static model of quality choice so that the rm sells its
product over time. Specically, a monopolist supplies a product over two periods, and
chooses its quality ex ante which is then xed for both periods. (One might think of the
8In this framework with reference dependence it is less appealing to study naive consumers. If period-2
consumers believe they are getting a bargain and gain utility from this, should this gain enter into the
welfare calculus even when their belief about the initial price is mistaken? It seems unpalatable that the
seller is able to boost welfare simply by misrepresenting its initial prices.
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product as a new phone or other piece of technology.) Quality is a continuous variable,
and if the rm chooses quality q  0 its xed cost is c(q), where we suppose that c()
is increasing and strictly convex and c(0) = c0(0) = 0. For simplicity, marginal costs of
supply are normalized to zero and there are no capacity constraints.9
An exogenous fraction  of consumers are keen and buy in the rst period, and
the remaining 1    consumers are casualand buy in the second. Keen consumers are
particularly interested in the product: they can discern directly the products quality, and
they are impatient to buy (which is why they buy in the rst period). Their valuation
is q for the product when its quality is q. Casual buyers cannot directly observe quality,
although they attempt to infer quality from the rms initial price, and their valuation
for the product is q when they believe its quality is q. Here, the parameter 0    1
reects the likely situation where casual buyers have a lower willingness-to-pay for the
item. We assume there is no (time) discounting, and the rm weights prot from the
two periods equally. In this case the e¢ cient quality level, denoted qe¤, maximizes the
concave expression [ + (1  )] q  c(q). Dene q^ to be the unique quality which satises
q^ = c(q^), so that q^ is the maximum quality which allows the rm to break-even in the
hypothetical situation where it faces only the  period-1 consumers.
A consumer buys the item if the price is no higher than her valuation, which depends on
observed (for a period-1 consumer) or estimated (for a period-2 consumer) product quality.
(We suppose that if any consumer is indi¤erent between buying and not buying, she will
buy from the rm.) The rms strategy consists of its choice of quality, its two prices p1
and p2, and its report of its initial price to period-2 consumers. In equilibrium the rms
strategy is optimal given consumer buying behaviour and the regulatory constraint to be
honest (if applicable), while the expectations of product quality by period-2 consumers,
which might depend on observed or reported prices, are consistent with the rms strategy
when those period-2 consumers are sophisticated or when the regulatory regime is honest.
The following result describes how period-2 consumers rationally estimate quality.
Lemma 1 Suppose period-2 consumers face price p2 and believe the initial price was pe1.
9One could perform a similar exercise where quality choice a¤ected the rms marginal cost rather than
its xed cost. In that case, one would need to consider whether the rm has an incentive to serve the
casual buyers, something which is automatic in the current formulation.
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Then their unique rational expectation of quality is
period-2 consumers believe quality is
8<:
q = pe1 if p
e
1  q^
q = 0 if pe1 > q^ :
(2)
Proof. Suppose period-2 consumers face price p2 and believe the initial price was pe1, and
conditional on these prices they expect that quality qe was chosen. First, note that period-
2 consumers buy if and only if qe  p2, and so the rms prot in the second period is
(1   )p21(qe   p2), where 1(x) = 1 if x  0 and 1(x) = 0 if x < 0. If the rm chooses
quality q  pe1, period-2 consumers believe the initial consumers will buy and that the rms
prot is pe1  c(q) + (1 )p21(qe  p2). Clearly the most protable quality choice in the
range q  pe1 is q = pe1, in which case the rm makes prot pe1 c(pe1)+(1 )p21(qe p2).
On the other hand, if the rm sets q < pe1 period-2 consumers believe it does not sell to
rst-period consumers and so makes prot  c(q) + (1   )p21(qe   p2). In the range
q < pe1, the most protable quality choice is q = 0, in which case the rm makes prot
(1 )p21(qe p2). By the denition of q^, the former prot, pe1 c(pe1)+(1 )p21(qe p2),
is greater than the latter prot, (1   )p21(qe   p2), if and only if pe1  q^. As claimed,
then, if pe1  q^ the period-2 consumers anticipate that the rm will choose quality q = pe1,
while if pe1 > q^ they anticipate it chooses q = 0.
It follows that if period-2 consumers believe the initial price was pe1, the rms maximum
prot in the second period is
2 =
8<:
(1  )pe1 if pe1  q^
0 if pe1 > q^ :
If the true initial price was p1, the rms maximum prot in the rst period (including the
xed cost) is
1 =
8<:
p1   c(p1) if p1  q^
0 if p1 > q^ :
The rms total prot is then 1 + 2 which takes the form (1) where 2 depends only on
pe1 and not separately on the true price p1.
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Consider rst the honest regime where pe1  p1, in which case the rms prot is
1(p1) + 2(p1) =
8<:
[ + (1  )] p1   c(p1) if p1  q^
0 if p1 > q^ :
Since this prot increases with p1 for p1  qe¤ and thereafter decreases, the rm will choose
its initial price and its quality equal to minfq^; qe¤g. If q^  qe¤, which is the case when  is
large enough, then the e¢ cient level of quality is achieved in the honest regime. If q^  qe¤,
the honest regime induces the rm to choose quality q^.10
In a laissez-faire regime, the rm will choose its initial price and its quality to maximize
period-1 prot, 1(p1). The equilibrium quality, denoted qlf, in this regulatory regime
therefore satises the rst-order condition c0(qlf) = . Since qlf < qe¤ and qlf < q^, it follows
that qlf < minfq^; qe¤g, which is the quality chosen in the honest regime. We deduce that
equilibrium quality (and initial price) is higher in the honest regime than the laissez-faire
regime, regardless of the sophistication of the casual buyers.
If period-2 consumers are sophisticated, they correctly anticipate the rms incentives
to choose quality, regardless of any claims the rm might make about its initial price, and
so pe1 = q
lf. The rm then chooses the second-period price p2 = p1 = qlf. If period-2
consumers are naive, though, they believe the rms claims about its initial price. Since
we assume that naive consumers mistakenly think that the rm must report accurately,
but are otherwise rational, their belief about quality if the rm announces its initial price
was pe1 is as described in (2). In this case, the optimal strategy of the rm is to choose
quality and actual initial price equal to q = p1 = qlf, to report in the second period that its
initial price was higher at pe1 = q^ and then to charge period-2 consumers the price p2 = q^.
(If  is not too small, in the sense that if q^ > qlf, this period-2 price is above the actual
initial price.) Second-period consumers naively pay more than the product is really worth
to them, and obtain negative surplus.
To illustrate, suppose that c(q) = 1
2
q2 and  =  = 1
2
, in which case q^ = 1, qe¤ = 3
4
and
qlf = 1
2
. In the honest regime (i) we have q = p1 = 34 and p2 =
3
8
, which is the e¢ cient
outcome. In environment (ii), the laissez-faire regime with sophisticated consumers, we
10As discussed in section 2, the seller is better o¤ reporting its initial price to period-2 consumers. (If
the rm makes no report of its initial price to period-2 consumers, their unique rational expectation of
quality is the laissez-faire quality qlf discussed shortly.)
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have q = p1 = 12 and p2 =
1
4
. In the laissez-faire regime with naive consumers, though,
while quality and true initial price is still q = p1 = 12 the rm announces to second-period
consumers that its initial price was 1 and charges these consumers p2 = 12 . In regime (i) or
(ii), the second-period price is half of the initial price, while in regime (iii) there is a false
discount o¤ered of 50% but in fact the saleprice is precisely the same as the original
price.
We summarise this discussion in the following result.
Proposition 2
(i) In the honest regime or the laissez-faire regime with sophisticated consumers the rm
o¤ers a proportional price discount in the second period equal to 1  . In the laissez-faire
regime with naive consumers, the rm o¤ers the same discount against its reported initial
price but this discount exaggerates the discount relative to the true initial price.
(ii) A change in regime from laissez-faire to honest will induce the rm to increase its
product quality and its initial price, and total welfare (prot plus consumer surplus) rises.
If second-period consumers are naive, the policy change increases their surplus.
(iii) In the laissez-faire regime, an education campaign which converts consumers from
naive to sophisticated types has no impact on total welfare, but boosts consumer surplus.
The impact of a move to an honest regime on the sellers prot is described in Proposition
1 above, and the move helps the rm if uninformed consumers are sophisticated but harms
the rm when they are naive.
In this model, the magnitude of the discount, 1 , is determined by our assumption that
casual consumers who buy later have a lower willingness-to-pay than the keen consumers
who buy early, and so intertemporal pricing reects a simple form of third-degree price
discrimination. A deeper implication of the model, though, is that consumers who buy
later care about the rms initial price, even though they are not able to buy the product
at that price. Casual buyers know that keen buyers have a good understanding of product
quality, and the rm is only able to sell to these buyers at a high price if the product has
high quality.
This model assumes that the product o¤ered to the two groups of consumers has the
same quality. If the rm can manufacture a di¤erent, lower quality, product to supply the
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casual buyers, the ability for early price to signal quality is eliminated. Naive consumers
may nevertheless believe they are getting a quality item in the sale. This phenomenon is
sometimes alleged to occur when high-end clothing brands sell specially made lower quality
clothing for sale only in out-of-town outletstores.11
3.2 Clearance sales
Sellers will often discount their products to clear their shelves of unsold stock. The reason
a particular product did not sell well is likely to be that early consumers did not think
its perceived quality justied its price or because they found a better-value alternative
elsewhere. As such, later consumers if they are imperfectly informed about the products
quality or the market alternatives will usually take the observation that the product did
not sell to be bad news. Plausibly, though, this news is less bad when the initial price
was higher, since then even a reasonably desirable product might not have sold well. For
this reason, a consumer who encounters a product on sale might rationally care about the
initial price as well as the current price.
Suppose for simplicity that a seller has a single unit of its product to sell over two
periods and weights its prot from the two periods equally. There is one consumer who
can buy only in the rst period, and a second consumer who can buy only in the second
period. There are several ways one might go on to specify the model in more detail.
For instance, as in Bose et al. (2006), the product might have unknown quality which is
exogenous to the rm, each consumer observes an exogenous and private signal of quality,
and the second consumer also observes the endogenous signal that the rst consumer did
not wish to purchase the product. This endogenous signal is less informative when the
11For instance, US Senator Richard Blumenthal (and three others) wrote to the FTC on 30 January 2014:
some analysts estimate that upwards of 85% of the merchandise sold in outlet stores was manufactured
exclusively for these stores. Outlet-specic merchandise is often of lower quality than goods sold at non-
outlet retail locations. While some retailers use di¤erent brand names and labels to distinguish merchandise
produced exclusively for outlets, other do not. This leaves consumers at a loss to determine the quality of
outlet-store merchandise carrying brand-name labels. [...] we are concerned that outlet store consumers are
being misled into believing they are purchasing products originally intended for sale at the regular retail
store. [...] It is a common practice at outlet stores to advertise a retail price alongside the outlet store
price even on made-for-outlet merchandise that does not sell at regular retail locations. Since the item
was never sold in the regular retail store or at the retail price, the retail price is impossible to substantiate.
[See www.blumenthal.senate.gov.]
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initial price was high, and the second consumer is more likely to buy the product for a
given private signal when she believes that the initial price was high.
However, perhaps the most direct way to model this situation is to modify Lazears
original model of a clearance sale. As in section 3.1, the rst consumer is keen and accu-
rately observes the products quality q and is willing to pay up to q to buy this product.
Unlike section 3.1, here the rm does not choose its quality and does not observe its qual-
ity, although it learns something about quality when its product does not sell in the rst
period. Suppose the prior probability that q is at least p is denoted Q(p), a decreasing
function. The second consumer is casual: she cannot observe q directly and is willing to
pay q for a product she believes has expected quality q. Write
(p)  E[q j q  p]
for the expected quality conditional on quality being no greater than p, which is an increas-
ing function of p. If the second buyer thinks the initial price was pe1, she infers that the
expected quality if the item remains unsold is (pe1) and so is willing to pay up to (p
e
1) for
the product in the clearance sale. The resulting second-period price, p2 = (pe1), is below
the (perceived) initial price pe1 for two reasons: the second consumer values the product less
than the rst consumer (since   1) and, more importantly, the second consumer revises
her value downwards when the item did not sell initially (since (p) < p). If pe1 > p1, so
that the second consumer believes the initial price was higher than was in fact the case,
when p2 = (pe1) this consumer pays too much for the product and su¤ers a negative
expected surplus.
Suppose the rms production cost for the single unit is normalized to zero. Then the
rms total prot if its true initial price is p1, while the second consumer thinks the initial
price was pe1, is
 = p1Q(p1) + (p
e
1)[1 Q(p1)] ; (3)
which takes the form (1). If the regime is honest (so pe1  p1), expression (3) becomes
 = p1Q(p1) + (p1)[1 Q(p1)] ; (4)
and in this environment the rm chooses p1 to maximize (4).
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In environment (ii), a laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated consumer, the consumer
does not observe but correctly anticipates the equilibrium initial price. That is to say, p1
is an equilibrium initial price in environment (ii) if
setting p1 = p1 maximizes p1Q(p1) + (p

1)[1 Q(p1)] : (5)
The following result collects together relevant features of this market environment:
Lemma 2 In the laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated period-2 consumer:
(i) an equilibrium initial price exists;
(ii) any such price is strictly below the equilibrium price in the honest regime;
(iii) the equilibrium initial price is unique if the density for q is logconcave.
Proof. (i) The price p1 is an equilibrium if it satises (5). In particular, choosing p1 = p

1
must maximize Q(p1)[p1   (p1)]. Dene P () to be the increasing function (assumed
continuous) such that P (c) maximizes Q(p)(p   c) for a given marginal cost c. Then the
equilibrium condition (5) is equivalent to
p1 = P ((p

1)) : (6)
When p1 = 0, the left-hand side of (6) is below the right-hand side. When p

1 is large, the
right-hand side of (6) converges to P (q), where q is the unconditional mean of q, and this
is lower than the left-hand side when p1 is large. Therefore, by continuity there exists a
price p1 which satises (5).
(ii) Suppose that p1 is an equilibrium initial price, i.e., a price that satises (5). In
the honest regime, where the rms prot is (4), suppose the rm chooses a price p1  p1.
Then
p1Q(p1) + (p1)[1 Q(p1)]  p1Q(p1) + (p1)[1 Q(p1)]
 p1Q(p1) + (p1)[1 Q(p1)] :
Here, the rst inequality follows from () being an increasing function, while the second
follows from (5). Thus, in the honest regime the rm is at least as well o¤ choosing price
p1 than any lower price. Using the property of p

1 in (5), one can check that prots in (4)
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are locally strictly increasing in p1 at p1, given that  is strictly increasing, and we deduce
that the initial price in the honest regime is strictly higher than any equilibrium price in
the laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated buyer.
(iii) We claim that if the density for q is logconcave, the right-hand side of (6) has slope
less than one, which establishes the uniqueness of the solution to (6). First, the density
of q being logconcave implies that the demand function Q() is logconcave, which in turn
implies that there is less than complete cost pass-through in monopoly pricing, in the sense
that the function P (c) has slope less than 1. Second, when the density of q is logconcave,
the function 1 Q() is also logconcave, and this in turn implies that the function (p) has
slope less than 1.12 Since   1, it follows that the right-hand side of (6) indeed has slope
less than 1.
Finally, in environment (iii), the laissez-faire regime with a naive consumer, if the seller
reports that its initial price was pe1 the second consumer is willing to pay (p
e
i ) for the
product on sale. Therefore, the seller would report a high initial price so that the second
consumer does not downgrade her estimate of quality. This implies that the rm can charge
p2 = q to the second buyer, where q is the unconditional mean of q, and its prot when
it actually chooses initial price p1 is
 = p1Q(p1) + q[1 Q(p1)] : (7)
Comparing this expression with (5) implies that the rm chooses a higher initial price when
it faces a naive consumer rather than a sophisticated consumer. Since the seller can extract
more prot from a naive consumer by manipulating her beliefs about quality, it has greater
incentive to keep its product unsold until the second period. (Nevertheless, the rm does
want sometimes to sell to the informed consumer in the rst period.) A comparison of the
optimal initial price in (7) with that for the honest regime is less clear-cut. However, when
 is close to 1 the initial price in the honest regime is sure to be higher.13
12See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for more details on some of these claims.
13When  = 1, one can check that expression (4) is monotonically increasing in p1 until Q(p1) = 0.
When  = 1, therefore, in the honest regime the rm does not sell at all in the rst period, which implies
that the second consumer does not revise her beliefs about v downwards, and then extracts all the surplus
from the uninformed second consumer. By contrast, when  = 1 the price that maximizes (7) is below the
choke price for the demand function Q().
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In each of the three environments the product is always sold to one of the consumers.
However, if  < 1, it is more e¢ cient to sell the product to the rst than the second
consumer. Since in any environment the rst consumer buys if and only if q  p1, it
follows that total welfare in any environment is a decreasing function of the initial price
p1. Provided  is not too small, the initial price is highest in the honest regime, which
therefore achieves the lowest level of welfare. The requirement to reveal the initial price
gives the rm an incentive to set a higher initial price in order to extract more revenue
from the second consumer, and the product is then sold too infrequently to the high-value
initial consumer.
To illustrate, consider the example where Q(p) = 1  p, so that (p) = 1
2
p, and  = 1
2
.
In the honest regime (i) we have p1 = 23 and p2 =
1
6
. In environment (ii), the laissez-faire
regime with a sophisticated consumer, we have p1 = 47 and p2 =
1
7
. In the laissez-faire
regime with a naive consumer, the rm announces that its initial price was 1 and charges
the second consumer price p2 = 14 , while in fact its initial price was p1 =
5
8
. Here, the
initial price is highest in the honest regime, which is therefore the worst for welfare, while
the laissez-faire regime with a sophisticated consumer is the most e¢ cient of the three
environments. However, in this example one can check that aggregate consumer surplus
(not merely the surplus of the second consumer) is negative in the laissez-faire regime with
a naive consumer, and so a move to the honest regime will benet consumers in aggregate.
We summarise this discussion in the following result.
Proposition 3
(i) When the second consumer is sophisticated, a change in regime from laissez-faire to
honest will induce the rm to increase its initial price, which harms the rst consumer and
total welfare. When the second consumer is naive, a change in regime from laissez-faire to
honest will induce the rm to increase its initial price provided  is not too small, which
harms the rst consumer and total welfare. The second consumer is made better o¤ with
this policy change.
(ii) In the laissez-faire regime, an education campaign which converts the second-period
consumer from a naive to a sophisticated type will induce the rm to reduce its initial
price, which boosts total welfare and the surplus of both consumers.
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Although the model here is supercially similar to that presented in section 3.1
both assume that later consumers cannot observe product quality, and in equilibrium
these consumers use the initial price as a signal of quality they have di¤erent policy
implications. In section 3.1, a move to an honest regime improved e¢ ciency and induced
the rm to o¤er a higher quality, albeit more expensive, product. In the current model,
though, a move to an honest regime induces a higher initial price without an accompanying
rise in quality (which is out of the rms control), and this harms overall welfare. However,
while a ban on ctitious pricing has contrasting e¤ects in these two models, a policy which
converts naive consumers to sophisticates within a laissez-faire regime is benecial for
consumers in both models.
Rather than exaggerate its initial price, another fraudulent tactic a seller might use
is to falsely claim that its product is new to the market. For instance, someone who is
having di¢ culty selling their home may choose to re-listand thereby reset the propertys
apparent length of time on the market. Tucker et al. (2013) describe a new regulation in
Massachusetts in 2006 which prevented this ability to re-list, and they found that slow-
moving homes experienced a $16,000 reduction in sale price compared to nearby Rhode
Island homes which were not subject to the regulation.
4 Conclusion
This paper has explored some economic e¤ects of discount pricing. Although there are
surely others, we suggested two reasons why a discounted price as opposed to a merely
low price may make a rational consumer more willing to buy. First, the information that
the product was initially sold at a high price may indicate that the rm chose to supply
a high-quality product. Second, a higher initial price can indicate that the products
exogenous quality, contingent on not selling well initially, is higher. We also discussed
discount pricing with behavioural consumers, who exhibit reference-dependent preferences
in the sense that they are more likely to buy a product at a given price if they believe that
earlier consumers paid a higher price.
Three environments were considered: (i) an honest regulatory regime in which a rms
report of its past price was required to be truthful; (ii) a laissez-faire regime where a rm
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can make false claims about its earlier prices and sophisticated consumers understand that
the rm is able to make such claims, and (iii) a laissez-faire regime with consumers who
mistakenly believe the rm must be honest in its pricing claims. Because it faces fewest
constraints on its pricing policy in (iii), but the tightest constraints in (ii), in our models
the rm obtained greatest prots with (iii) and lowest prots with (ii). We saw that a
regime change which requires honest price claims will cause the rm to raise its initial
price: early consumers are exploitedto deliver a larger discount to later buyers. In the
model where the rm chooses its quality, a move from a laissez-faire to an honest regime
enabled the rm to o¤er a more e¢ cient level of quality, and if consumers were naive this
policy shift also beneted them. In the model with exogenous but uncertain quality, the
high initial price induced by the honest regulatory regime was harmful for welfare, although
in an example the honest policy helps consumers in aggregate if they are naive.
This paper focused on one way a seller can deliver a bargain, which was to o¤er a
discount on a previous price. There are other ways to give an impression of value-for-
money, which could perhaps be analyzed along similar lines. For instance, a rm might
o¤er a quantity discount, say of the form of buy 3 books for the price of 2in a bookstore.
Such a tactic might reect a more standard motive to discriminate between those who want
a single book and those willing to buy more, alongside a desire to make a purchase appear
a bargain. However, a common tactic is the more extreme buy one, get one free, where
it is harder to imagine a traditional price-discrimination motive.14 (A devious version of
this would be rst to double the regular price, and then to stick a 2 for the price of 1
label on, which keeps the unit price the same but adds the appearance of a bargain.)
Another motive to o¤er a bargain is if the rm must sell. For instance, produce in
a supermarket might be approaching its sell-by date, and the rm might o¤er a genuinely
low price to get rid of its expiring stock. A label which states must sell today or a
shop with a closing downsale sign, if credible, may induce consumers to buy without
further search (or to buy in greater volume then they would do otherwise). Such a tactic
14Jahedi (2011) experimentally investigates a situation where a seller o¤ers two units of its product for
little more than the price of one unit. He shows how consumers are less likely to buy two units when faced
with the choice from {buy nothing, buy two units for $1} than they are when faced with the larger choice
set {buy nothing, buy one unit for $0.97, buy two units for $1}. Jahedi designs the experiments so that
subjects know that prices have no signaling role (such as the signaling roles we analyze in our models),
and suggests that some of his subjects have an intrinsic taste for bargains.
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could operate without any reference to a previous higher price. As usual, though, there is
much scope for deception. Ehrlich (1990, page 43), in his account of the piano market in
the nineteenth century, wrote: Another common practice was the advertisement of new
instruments as second hand for individual enforced sale by a recently bereaved widowor
gentleman about to emigrate. Some were genuine bargains, others meretricious rubbish,
deliberately assembled and falsely labelled to impress the gullible.
Yet another way to give the impression of value for money is to fool the buyer that he
or she is the lucky recipient of an accidental discount. In his account of sales practices,
Cialdini (2001, page 12) describes the Drubeck brothers, Sid and Harry, who owned a
mens tailor shop [...] in the 1930s. Whenever Sid had a new customer trying on suits in
front of the shops three-sided mirror, he would admit to a hearing problem and repeatedly
request that the man speak more loudly to him. Once the customer had found a suit he
liked and asked for the price, Sid would call to his brother, the head tailor, at the back
of the room, Harry, how much for this suit? Looking up from his work and greatly
exaggerating the suits true price Harry would call back, For that beautiful, all wool
suit, forty-two dollars.Pretending not to have heard and cupping his hand to his ear, Sid
would ask again. Once more Harry would reply, Forty-two dollars. At this point, Sid
would turn to the customer and report, He says twenty-two dollars.Many a man would
hurry to buy the suit and scramble out of the shop with his [...] bargain before poor Sid
discovered the mistake.
Regulation might move from a laissez-faire to an honest regulatory regime by means
of legal sanctions which act e¤ectively to prohibit misleading price claims. Several ju-
risdictions have rules in place to combat deceptive pricing.15 In the United States, the
Federal Trade Commissions Guides Against Deceptive Pricing (para. 233.1) distinguishes
between genuine and ctitious discounts. For instance, where an articial, inated price
was established for the purpose of enabling the subsequent o¤er of a large reduction - the
bargainbeing advertised is a false one; the purchaser is not receiving the unusual value he
expects. In such a case, the reducedprice is, in reality, probably just the sellers regular
price.
15Some jurisdictions also have policies to prevent permanent salesby requiring all sales to occur on
stipulated dates. Thus the summer sales in Paris in 2016 had to take place between 22 June and 2 August.
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Nevertheless, as Rubin (2008) observes, in recent years there have been few attempts
by the FTC to enforce its guidelines, although individual States sometimes do so. Rubin
suggests (page 172) that in part this is because the FTC recognises that any advertising
that stresses prices is likely to ultimately lead to lower prices. Rubin also suggests that
most consumers are sophisticated and discount claims made by a rm about its prices at
other times or in other outlets. However, even with sophisticated consumers there may
be benets in a move to an honest regime, if feasible; for instance, in our model where
the initial price reected the rmsproduct quality such a move helped a rm supply a
higher level of quality. The observation that consumers are likely to be sophisticated is not
enough on its own to rule out an honest regime as a desirable aim.
Perhaps the principal reason why regulators are often reluctant to combat deceptive
pricing is that it is hard to enforce, or perhaps even coherently to formulate, e¤ective policy
towards misleading pricing. As Rubin notes, a basic problem is how to determine how few
sales need to occur at the full price, or for how short a time the full price is available, for a
sales campaign stating was $200, now $100to be classied as misleading.16 Sellers have a
strong motive to make their customers feel they are getting a special deal, and have myriad
ways to achieve this. It may be as unrealistic and undesirable to suppose that regulation
can address all forms of false discounting as it is to forbid a sales assistant falsely claiming
that a customer looks goodin a particular item of clothing.
In any event, the potential benet from policy which shifts from laissez-faire to an
honest regime can be realized only if it is e¤ectively enforced. Indeed, as Rubin notes
(page 174), and as with many kinds of consumer protection policy, weakly enforced policy
may be worse than no policy. If consumers are under the impression that it is illegal for
a rm to make misleading claims perhaps as the result of one high-prole prosecution
they abandon their usual caution and act on these claims. If the policy is not in fact
often enforced, consumers are thereby converted into naivetypes and environment (iii),
arguably the worst case, is the outcome.17
16Section 4 of the report by the Competition & Markets Authority (2015) describes current policy in
the UK. For instance, one guideline is that a discount of the form was £ X, now £ Yshould be displayed
for no longer than the price £ X was originally displayed.
17Nelson (1974, page 749) writes: There is another source of deceptive advertising: the law. Whenever
a low on advertising practices is moderately enforced, deceptive advertising is sure to occur. Take, for
example, the law prohibiting the mislabeling of the fabric content of clothing. If that law is su¢ ciently
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An alternative approach might be for a regulator or consumer body to mount a publicity
campaign which informs consumers that rms are in fact often able to present misleading
claims without penalty. Such a policy, if e¤ective, could convert naive consumers into
sophisticated types and so move from environment (iii) to (ii). If it is simply too hard,
except in the most agrant cases, to combat deceptive pricing directly, the next best thing
may be to alert consumers to the presence of fraudsters in many markets.
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